无秩序的多极化-中国、美国与全球化的退却

无秩序的多极化-中国、美国与全球化的退却

                                       中文版前言

今年（2026）2月11号，我将此文的英文原版《Multipolarity Without Order-China, the United States, and the Retreat of Globalization》投稿FA，2月12号进入待定审议程序（Foreign Affairs changed the status to In-Progress Thu, Feb 12, 2026 9:34 AM），4月2号确定被拒绝（Declined by Foreign Affairs. Thu, Apr 2, 2026 3:43 PM）。现在同时给出中文翻译版和英文原版，算是首次公开发表。

                                               正文

近年来，“多极化”已成为描述国际体系变化的常用术语。人们经常用它来指代美国主导地位的衰落、新权力中心的崛起，或是更加平衡的世界的前景。然而，这种说法掩盖的远多于阐明的。如今正在发生的并非一个稳定的多极秩序的巩固，而是一种权力分散速度超过共同运行规则发展速度的过渡状态。

两种相互交织的动态加剧了这种状态：一是中美之间日益加剧的结构性竞争；二是曾经通过共同的制度和预期，来维系相互依存关系的全球化进程的局部退却。这些力量共同重塑着全球体系，加剧了不确定性，扩大了误解，并增加了局部摩擦升级为更大规模动荡的可能性。因此，要理解当下的局面，就必须超越意识形态叙事和传统的权力转移模式，转而分析不同的治理模式如何在高度互联的全球结构中运作。

在早期，多极体系往往显得相对稳定，因为它们之间的联系较为松散。经济相互依存程度有限，技术扩散缓慢，政治冲突通常可以控制在区域边界之内。而如今的全球体系运行环境截然不同。高度一体化的供应链、金融网络和信息基础设施使得冲击能够更快地传播到更广泛的领域。遏制冲击变得越来越困难。

在这样的环境下，多极化不再分散风险，而是加剧了风险。权力分散，但责任分配并不明确。规则备受争议，但可行的替代方案却不完善。其结果是，协调机制滞后于权力分散。这增加了误判、过度反应或局部争端升级为更大规模动荡的可能性。从这个意义上讲，多极化与其说是一种新的秩序，不如说是一种高压的运行环境。

在这样的环境下，权力分散加剧，竞争本身的性质也随之改变。竞争不再局限于军事平衡或外交联盟，而是日益延伸至经济协调、技术标准和系统性风险管理等领域。曾经被视为稳定力量的相互依存，如今已成为政治博弈的对象，各国不仅重新评估彼此的对外意图，也重新审视对方的内部运作逻辑。

这种动态变化在美中关系的演变中体现得尤为明显。几十年来，全球化建立在部分趋同的假设之上。人们曾期望融入共享的市场和制度能够协调监管实践、战略激励和行为预期。然而，这一假设已然动摇。随着全球化从其早期的制度深度退缩，治理和经济协调方面的结构性差异日益凸显，并在一个紧密耦合的全球体系中显得更为重要。

随着美中竞争的加剧，经济相互依存越来越多地被置于安全视角下进行解读。供应链被视为潜在的脆弱点，技术流动被视为杠杆来源，制度规则被视为战略博弈的舞台。然而，这种转变并未消除相互依存，而是重新调整了其作用。相互依存不再是稳定预期，而是揭示了各个系统在风险管理、权力分配以及在持续压力下应对不确定性方面的差异。

因此，核心问题不在于哪一方拥有更优越的意图或道德主张，而在于哪个系统能够在长期压力下更可预测地运行。在全球高度耦合的环境中，稳定性更多地来源于实际的运作能力，而非公开的承诺。这种能力包括维持经济协调、在不引发系统性崩溃的情况下管理技术竞争，以及限制国内脆弱性的外部化。随着时间的推移，正是这种系统间的相对表现——而非意识形态的胜利——决定了哪些实践会被效仿、制度化并融入不断演变的全球秩序。

对于政策制定者而言，其意义令人警醒。多极化格局和全球化的退却都无法通过口号或试图恢复过去的框架来解决。核心任务在于如何在一个既保持高度互联又日益分裂的体系内管控竞争压力。这要求尽可能保持可预测性，在相互依存不可避免的情况下维持有效的合作，并避免将结构性竞争与生存威胁混为一谈。

多极化格局、美中竞争以及全球化的退却，并非预示着一个迅速巩固的新秩序的到来。相反，它预示着一段较长的结构性不确定性时期。未来的全球体系并非由单一的对抗或意识形态的抉择所塑造，而是由不同体系在持续压力下展现出的运作、适应和共存能力所决定。当前最大的风险并非竞争本身，而是缺乏能够维系竞争内部稳定的运作基础。

Multipolarity Without Order

China, the United States, and the Retreat of Globalization

In recent years, “multipolarity” has become the dominant shorthand for describing changes in the international system. It is frequently invoked to suggest the decline of U.S. predominance, the rise of new power centers, or the promise of a more balanced world. Yet this language obscures more than it clarifies. What is unfolding today is not the consolidation of a stable multipolar order. It is a transitional condition in which power dispersion has outpaced the development of shared operational rules.

This condition is intensified by two overlapping dynamics: the deepening structural competition between the United States and China, and the partial retreat of globalization that once helped manage interdependence through common institutions and expectations. Together, these forces are reconfiguring the global system. They heighten uncertainty, amplify misperception, and raise the likelihood that localized frictions escalate into broader disruptions. Understanding this moment therefore requires moving beyond ideological narratives and traditional power-transition models, toward an analysis of how different modes of governance operate within the same highly interconnected global structure.

In earlier eras, multipolar systems often appeared relatively stable because they were loosely coupled. Economic interdependence was limited, technological diffusion was slow, and political conflicts could frequently be contained within regional boundaries. Today’s global system operates under materially different conditions. Deeply integrated supply chains, financial networks, and information infrastructures enable shocks to travel more quickly and across wider domains. Containment has become increasingly difficult.

Under such conditions, multipolarity no longer disperses risk; it aggregates risk. Authority is fragmented, but responsibility is not clearly redistributed. Rules are contested, yet viable alternatives remain incomplete. The result is a system in which coordination mechanisms lag behind power dispersion. This increases the likelihood that miscalculation, overreaction, or localized disputes escalate into wider disruptions. Multipolarity, in this sense, is less a new order than a high-pressure operating environment.

When power dispersion unfolds within such an environment, competition itself begins to change in character. Rivalry is no longer confined to military balance or diplomatic alignment. It increasingly extends into economic coordination, technological standards, and the management of systemic risk. Interdependence—once treated as a stabilizing force—has become subject to political contestation, as states reassess not only external intentions but also the internal operating logic of their counterparts.

Nowhere is this dynamic more evident than in the evolving relationship between the United States and China. For decades, globalization rested on an assumption of partial convergence. Integration into shared markets and institutions was expected to align regulatory practices, strategic incentives, and expectations of behavior. That assumption has weakened. As globalization retreats from its earlier institutional depth, structural differences in governance and economic coordination have become increasingly visible. They are also more consequential within a single, tightly coupled global system.

As U.S.–China competition has intensified, economic interdependence has increasingly been interpreted through a security lens. Supply chains are reassessed as potential vulnerabilities, technology flows as sources of leverage, and institutional rules as arenas of strategic contestation. Yet this shift has not eliminated interdependence. It has recalibrated its role. Rather than stabilizing expectations, interdependence now reveals differences in how each system manages risk, allocates authority, and absorbs uncertainty under sustained pressure.

The central issue, therefore, is not which side possesses superior intentions or moral claims. It is which system can operate more predictably under prolonged conditions of stress. In a tightly coupled global environment, stability emerges less from declarative commitments than from demonstrated operational capacity. That capacity includes maintaining economic coordination, managing technological competition without systemic rupture, and limiting the externalization of domestic vulnerabilities. Over time, it is this comparative system performance—not ideological victory—that shapes which practices are emulated, institutionalized, and embedded in the evolving global order.

For policymakers, the implications are sobering. Neither multipolarity nor the retreat of globalization can be addressed through slogans or attempts to restore past frameworks. The central task is to manage competitive pressures within a system that will remain deeply interconnected yet increasingly fragmented. This requires preserving predictability where possible, maintaining functional cooperation where interdependence is unavoidable, and avoiding the conflation of structural rivalry with existential threat.

The convergence of multipolarity, U.S.–China competition, and the retreat of globalization does not point toward a rapidly consolidating new order. Instead, it suggests an extended period of structural indeterminacy. The future global system will be shaped not by a single confrontation or ideological resolution. It will be shaped by the demonstrated ability of different systems to operate, adapt, and coexist under sustained pressure. The greatest risk of the current moment is not competition itself, but the absence of operational foundations capable of sustaining stability within it.