2018年毕汝谐：中国必将蹈30年前日本的覆辙
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- 汝谐毕：
Below is a polished, publication-ready English version in a serious opinion-essay style suitable for media commentary.
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## March 2, 2024 — Author’s Note
This essay was originally written in April 2018.
Six years have passed.
Time, as always, is the most impartial arbiter.
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# Will China Repeat Japan’s Path of Thirty Years Ago?
**By Bi Ruixie (Writer, New York)**
As **Donald Trump** intensified pressure on China, the question inevitably arose: will China follow the path Japan walked thirty years ago?
The dominant view within mainland China is to highlight China’s present strengths while pointing to Japan’s past weaknesses, drawing the comforting conclusion that history will not repeat itself. Optimism prevails—often shading into complacency.
I take the opposite approach. I compare Japan’s strengths thirty years ago with China’s weaknesses today. Frank words may grate on the ear, but they must nevertheless be spoken.
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## I. The International Environment
Postwar Japan was a pacifist state without a formal military establishment, committed to international cooperation and broadly integrated into the global order.
By contrast, President **Xi Jinping** departed from **Deng Xiaoping**’s strategic principle of “hide your strength and bide your time.” Instead of maintaining a low profile, Beijing has increasingly projected ambitions of parity with—or even replacement of—the United States. When the “king of the forest” perceives a challenger to the throne, the challenger’s position becomes perilous.
Confident in China’s financial resources, Beijing has embarked on expansive global initiatives, investing heavily abroad and often disregarding established international norms. Such assertiveness has drawn scrutiny and suspicion. Many countries, though cautious in public, harbor unease. Once Washington calls for alignment, others are likely to reassess their positions and recalibrate accordingly.
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## II. The Nature of the Rivalry
The U.S.–Japan trade frictions of the late twentieth century were disputes within an alliance framework—competition over economic benefits among strategic partners. They were “civil” conflicts, unlikely to escalate into military confrontation.
Today, however, China has been formally designated by the United States as a “strategic competitor.” In American national security discourse, China is grouped alongside Russia and other systemic threats to U.S. interests. The rivalry is structural rather than transactional.
For Washington, preserving its post–Cold War position as the world’s preeminent power remains a core national interest. Strategic competition with China is therefore viewed in existential terms rather than as a mere trade imbalance.
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## III. Domestic Social Conditions
Japan’s society in the late twentieth century was relatively stable and cohesive. Contemporary China faces more complex internal pressures: widening inequality, public resentment toward officials and wealth concentration, and frequent social unrest beneath the surface.
Although China proclaims an era of prosperity, expenditures on internal stability maintenance reportedly exceed military spending—a phenomenon rare in world history.
Ordinary citizens care less about who holds supreme office than about their livelihoods. Sustained economic growth has been essential to maintaining social stability. Environmental concerns are often addressed gradually so as not to disrupt employment in what has long been known as the “world’s factory.”
Should economic momentum falter significantly, social tensions could intensify. History offers reminders—figures such as Li Zicheng and Zhang Xianzhong symbolize how internal upheaval, once ignited, can overwhelm established authority.
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## IV. The Taiwan Issue
The Northern Territories dispute between Japan and Russia, a legacy of World War II, has remained peripheral to Japan’s core political stability.
For China, however, Taiwan represents a matter of central strategic sensitivity. Actions taken during the Trump administration—including high-level contact with Taiwan’s leadership and the signing of the Taiwan Travel Act—heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing faces a difficult calculus: restraint may appear to weaken national resolve, while military action would risk catastrophic consequences, potentially undoing decades of economic integration and reform. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea remain flashpoints where miscalculation could carry serious implications.
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## V. Political Culture
Japan’s bureaucratic system has historically maintained relatively high standards of administrative integrity, notwithstanding individual scandals.
China has waged an extensive anti-corruption campaign in recent years, reshaping its political landscape. Yet corruption has long been systemic, and political loyalty does not always equate to genuine cohesion. Internal divisions, if they exist, are seldom visible but can complicate unified strategic action.
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## VI. Resources and Energy
Despite its vast territory, China—like Japan—remains heavily dependent on imported energy and key raw materials. Global sea lanes and strategic chokepoints are largely under the protection of the U.S.-led security architecture. In times of heightened tension, vulnerabilities in supply chains can carry significant strategic weight.
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## Conclusion
Taken together, these factors suggest that structural parallels with Japan’s experience three decades ago deserve sober reflection.
Japan’s confrontation with the United States in the late twentieth century culminated in economic stagnation after the bursting of its asset bubble. Whether China can avoid a comparable trajectory remains an open question.
History rarely repeats itself in identical form, but it often rhymes. When a rising power collides with an established one, the outcome depends not only on economic scale but on strategic patience, institutional resilience, and domestic cohesion.
The verdict, as always, belongs to time.
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屏蔽 举报回复 - 白草：
说重蹈覆辙的时候，怎么不提日本是民主政体，中国是专制呢？应该是这个根本性的制度不同导致中日经济也不同才对吧？
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