The Illusion of Governance in Imperial Politics

帝国政治的政体幻象

——圣约、杠杆原理、家国-黨国-民国与现代文明
— Covenants, the Lever Principle, and the Critique of Family-State, Party-State, Republic, and Modern Civilization

Archer Hong Qian

目录 | Contents

一、圣约（律法之约、福音之约、共生之约）实为政治文明根基；

The Covenant (Law, Gospel, and Symbiosis) as the foundation of political civilization

二、三重圣约与现代政治文明的展开

The Threefold Covenant and the Unfolding of Modern Political Civilization

三、“政黨政治”之“黨”（Party）与“黨国”之“黨”（Gangs）根本区别；

The essential difference between the “Party” in party politics and the “Party” in a Party-State (Gangs)

四、家国逻辑 vs 黨国逻辑 vs 民国逻辑的“杠杆支点”；

The lever fulcrum of Family-State vs. Party-State vs. Republic

五、家国逻辑 vs 黨国逻辑 vs 民国逻辑的“杠杆支点”（续）；

The Lever Fulcrum of Family-State vs. Party-State vs. Republic (continued)

六、揭示“官阶大一统”与“特权共同体”的费力杠杆；

The paradox of the costly lever in “hierarchical unification” and “privileged communities”

七、“官阶大一统”与“特权共同体”的费力杠杆（续）；

The Paradox of the Costly Lever in Hierarchical Unification and Privileged Communities (continued)

八、前政要直言中国政体“失德、失能、失职”；

Former statesmen’s blunt remarks: China’s regime as “immoral, incompetent, irresponsible”

九、抽空“We the People”的荒谬逻辑——“主权高于人权”；

十、WTO 15年缓冲期未完成的转型，以及“河蟹社会—党进民退”的现实；

The failed transformation after WTO’s 15-year buffer, and the reality of “River Crab Society—Party advances, people retreat”

十一、所谓“亲中派”实为投机犬儒，资本与权力沆瀣一气又勾心斗角。

So-called “pro-China factions” as cynical opportunists colluding and scheming with power

一、圣约（律法之约、福音之约、共生之约）实为政治文明根基

The Covenant (Law, Gospel, and Symbiosis) as the Foundation of Political Civilization

北京掌上国学院创办人杨鹏教授，把两希文明与英国人对现代政治文明的世界性贡献和影响梳理得清楚明白，燃犀照幽，洞察古今。大有我在1982年初读温斯顿·丘吉尔的《英语国家史略》（这部作品也为他赢得诺贝尔文学奖）时，所感受到的那种大家风范！

Professor Yang Peng, founder of Beijing Palm Academy, has clarified the two classical civilizations and Britain’s global contribution and influence on modern political civilization with great lucidity, shedding light on both past and present. This gave me the same sense of scholarly grandeur I felt when I first read Winston Churchill’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples in 1982—a work that also won him the Nobel Prize for Literature.

我的理解亦是如此：
因《圣约》（Holy Bible）——律法之约、福音之约、共生之约的真理，才由此奠定了人的天然权利。人（生命）作为受造于God的存在，本自具足又非独存，生而赋予自组织连接适应平衡再平衡的交互主体共生（Intersubjective Symbiosism）能力，因而拥有自然、自由、自在的普遍约定权利。

My understanding is the same:
It is because of the Covenant in the Holy Bible—the Law Covenant, the Gospel Covenant, and the Symbiosis Covenant—that the foundation of natural human rights was laid. Human beings (life), as created beings of God, are inherently complete but not isolated. They are endowed at birth with the capacity for self-organizing connectivity, adaptation, balance, and re-balance—that is, the capacity for intersubjective symbiosism. Hence, they possess the universally covenanted rights of living naturally, freely, and authentically.

人（LIFE）这些权利不应被国家-君王、教廷-教主、宗法-长辈三种 TRUST 特权及任何理性工具（AI）所侵犯，反而必须受到保护。于是，意识、律法、制度的建构以及行动，便成为世间最大公义的践约过程，并推动了生活、生態、生命的展开与绽放。

These rights of human beings (LIFE) must not be violated by the three privileged TRUSTS—the state-king, the church-pope, the clan-elder—nor by any rational tool (such as AI). Instead, they must be protected. Thus, the construction of consciousness, law, institutions, and action becomes the greatest covenantal practice of justice in the world, propelling the unfolding and flourishing of life, ecology, and existence.

律法之约 → 边界与秩序
福音之约 → 自由与良智
共生之约 → 生命与互助

Law Covenant → Boundaries and order
Gospel Covenant → Freedom and conscience
Symbiosis Covenant → Life and mutual aid

三重结合，才真正支撑起现代政治文明与未来的 Intersubjective Symbiosism（交互主体共生）。

Only through the combination of all three can modern political civilization and the future of Intersubjective Symbiosism be truly sustained.

二、三重圣约与现代政治文明的展开

The Threefold Covenant and the Unfolding of Modern Political Civilization

在科技与人文并进的今天，当代人的使命正是：
如何妥善处理 生命（LIFE）—工具理性（AI军团）—组织形態（TRUST） 这三重交互主体共生 (Intersubjective Symbiosism) 的关系！

In today’s era, when technology and humanitye (LIFE) – Rational Tools (AI armies) – advance side by side, the mission of modern humanity is precisely this:

How to properly manage the relationship of Lif Organizational Forms (TRUSTS) within the triadic structure of Intersubjective Symbiosism.

三、“政黨政治”之“黨”（Party）与“黨国”之“黨”（Gangs）根本区别

The Essential Difference between the “Party” in Party Politics and the “Party” in a Party-State (Gangs)

澳洲华人精算师郭生祥，有一个很趣的观察，就是从阿基米德杠杆原理分析“家国”到“黨国”，只是把中间的点前移，把家换成了黨，把民换成了官。

Chinese-Australian actuary Guo Shengxiang has made an interesting observation: analyzing the transformation from “Family-State” to “Party-State” through Archimedes’ lever principle, one finds that the fulcrum has simply been moved forward—replacing “family” with “party” and “people” with “officials.”

从周公孔子商鞅、秦皇汉武、唐宗宋祖、孙袁毛蒋邓，人性常识和家国伦理关系重心，都是本末倒置，这种本末倒置本身决定了中国政治经济文化的阿基米德杠杆平衡的支点，是“家国”而不是主权在民的“国家”。

From Duke of Zhou, Confucius, Shang Yang, Qin Shihuang, Han Wudi, Tang Taizong, Song Taizu, to Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shikai, Mao Zedong, Chiang Kai-shek, and Deng Xiaoping, the focus of common sense and family-state ethics has always been inverted. This inversion determined that the Archimedean lever balance point of Chinese political, economic, and cultural systems was the “Family-State,” not a “nation” grounded in popular sovereignty.

而且，家国皇权换成黨国官权背后的逻辑，这里的“黨”与美西的“政黨政治”中的“黨”（Party）只是形似而神异，这个“黨国”之“黨”（Gangs）并非 We the People 自由组合的 Party，而是“打坐天下”的 Gangs，是若干帮派“特权共同体”，而且，这个替换“家”的“黨”，本质上依旧是“家”，是若干个“家族”。

Moreover, the logic behind replacing family sovereignty with Party-State officialdom lies in the difference between the “Party” in Western party politics and the “Party” in a Party-State (Gangs). The latter is not a freely organized party of We the People, but rather a collection of gangs—a “privileged community” of factions. In essence, the “Party” that replaces the “Family” is still a family: a collection of clans.

无论是吉拉斯的《新阶级》，还是前些年中国社科院、国务院和中央研究室的调查……都证明其真。

Whether in Milovan Djilas’ The New Class or in reports by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the State Council, and the Central Research Office in 2006, the evidence shows the same truth.

四、家国逻辑 vs 黨国逻辑 vs 民国逻辑的“杠杆支点”

The Lever Fulcrum of Family-State vs. Party-State vs. Republic

简单说，就是“黨管干部”名义下“官阶大一统”（钱宏2006提出的概念）体制下500个特权家庭+他们的子孙、亲友和依附家庭5000万人，垄断、操纵金融、外贸、国土开发、大型工程、证券五大领域，乃至整个中国的政策、社会、自然、人力、城乡资源分配和变现方式。

Simply put, under the system of “Party controls the cadres” and “hierarchical unification” (a concept proposed by Qian Hong in 2006), 500 privileged families—together with their descendants, relatives, and dependent households totaling about 50 million people—monopolize and manipulate finance, foreign trade, land development, major infrastructure projects, and securities, as well as the policies, society, natural resources, human resources, and rural-urban distribution and monetization mechanisms of the entire country.

但是，黨国政治+特权共同体的致命弱点，是如果没有“制度外部性”的能量输入，就必然陷入“费力杠杆”（动力臂小于阻力臂时）结构性失衡——庞大上层建筑与超负荷经济基础的矛盾冲突——中国历来不是阶级冲突而是“官民冲突”！

However, the fatal weakness of the Party-State combined with its privileged community is this: without “institutional external” energy input, it inevitably falls into a “costly lever” structure (where the effort arm is shorter than the resistance arm), producing structural imbalance. This creates irreconcilable contradictions between an oversized superstructure and an overburdened economic base. Historically, China’s conflicts have never been about class struggle but always about officials vs. the people.

常识地说，就是没有谁养得起这个官阶大一统的黨！

In plain terms: no one can afford to feed this Party of hierarchical unification!

毛泽东“七八年来一次”的文革思维和邓小平的“中国特色”改革思维，都不过是“费力杠杆”失衡后引发的“帮派-家族循环取代”，这与美西方的“民主政治选举周期”完全不可同日而语。

Mao Zedong’s idea of launching a Cultural Revolution “ev思维ery seven or eight years” and Deng Xiaoping’s model of “reforms with Chinese characteristics” are nothing more than cycles of factional and clan replacement triggered by the costly lever imbalance. This is completely incomparable to the democratic electoral cycles of the West.

这也解释了名难副实的 PRC 大陆，从有限开放到战狼外交的最近四十年中外（特别是中美）关系的演化过程——不但中国人民养不起中式黨国特权共同体，就是美国人民、世界人民加在一起，也养不起！

This also explains the evolution of the PRC’s foreign relations—especially Sino-U.S. relations—over the past forty years, from limited opening-up to wolf-warrior diplomacy. Not only can the Chinese people not afford to support this Party-State privileged community, even if the American people and the rest of the world combined their resources, they still could not support it!

因为它根本就是人的机体中长出的一种恶性肿瘤——恶性肿瘤细胞能高效地利用周围的营养物质和氧气来快速增殖，并通过代谢重编程适应缺氧环境，即使在恶劣条件下也能迅速生长，“吞噬”正常细胞的营养，使得癌细胞能够持续存活和扩散。

Because it is essentially like a malignant tumor in the human body: tumor cells can efficiently consume surrounding nutrients and oxygen to multiply rapidly, reprogramming their metabolism to adapt to hypoxic environments. Even under adverse conditions, they can still grow rapidly, devouring the nutrients of normal cells, enabling the cancer to survive and spread continuously.

它们有着“强盗”般的吸收能力、选择更有利其生存的代谢方式来获取能量和养分，“走自己的路同，让别人无路可走”！

They have a robber-like capacity for absorption, choosing metabolic pathways most favorable for their survival, seizing energy and nutrients—“taking their own path while leaving no path for others.”

这就是川普第一个任期就提出解决中美贸易失衡，首先需要中国进行“结构性改变”（其实胡温2003年就主动提出过“调经济结构，转政府职能”）的原因！

This is precisely why, during his first term, Donald Trump insisted that to resolve Sino-U.S. trade imbalances, China must undergo “structural change.” (In fact, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao had already proposed in 2003 to “adjust the economic structure and transform government functions.”)

五、家国逻辑 vs 黨国逻辑 vs 民国逻辑的“杠杆支点”（续）

The Lever Fulcrum of Family-State vs. Party-State vs. Republic (continued)

结黨逻辑（黨国杠杆）

Factional Logic (Party-State Lever)

┌──────────────┐

│   官僚上层建筑 │（特权共同体）

└──────────────┘

▲

（超负荷消耗）

│

┌───────支点───────┐

│      “黨” (Gangs)       │ ← 本末倒置：支点在黨

└─────────────────┘

│

动力臂   短      │          阻力臂   长

（人民创造力）   │ （特权消耗、官僚冗余）

│

▼

结构性失衡 → 官民冲突

┌──────────────┐

│ Bureaucratic Superstructure │ (Privileged Community)

└──────────────┘

▲

(Overburdened Consumption)

│

┌─────── Fulcrum ───────┐

│     “Party” (Gangs)   │ ← Inverted: Fulcrum on Party

└───────────────────────┘

│

Effort Arm  Short      │      Resistance Arm  Long

(People’s creativity)  │ (Privileged consumption, bureaucratic redundancy)

│

▼

Structural Imbalance → Official–People Conflict

民国逻辑（宪政杠杆）

Republican Logic (Constitutional Lever)

┌──────────────┐

│   公共治理体系 │（宪政+民选政府）

└──────────────┘

▲

（有限负担、公共责任）

│

┌───────支点───────┐

│   “We the People”   │ ← 主权在民：支点在人民

└─────────────────┘

│

动力臂   长        │          阻力臂   短

（公民创造力、自由市场）│ （有限税负、可监督政府）

│

▼

良性平衡 → 民主循环

┌──────────────┐

│  Public Governance System │ (Constitution + Elected Gov’t)

└──────────────┘

▲

(Limited Burden, Public Responsibility)

│

┌─────── Fulcrum ───────┐

│   “We the People”     │ ← Sovereignty of the People

└───────────────────────┘

│

Effort Arm  Long       │      Resistance Arm  Short

Civic creativity, free market │Limited taxation, accountable gov’t

│

▼

Healthy Balance → Democratic Cycle

对照总结

Comparative Summary

结黨逻辑 → 支点在“黨”，动力臂短、阻力臂长 → 失衡、依赖外部输入 → 官民冲突、周期性折腾。

Factional Logic → Fulcrum on the Party, short effort arm, long resistance arm → imbalance, dependence on external inputs → official–people conflicts, cyclical upheavals.

民国逻辑 → 支点在“民”，动力臂长、阻力臂短 → 自我平衡、制度可更新 → 民主循环、良性发展。

Republican Logic → Fulcrum on the people, long effort arm, short resistance arm → self-balancing, renewable institutions → democratic cycles, healthy development.

六、“官阶大一统”与“特权共同体”的费力杠杆悖论

The Paradox of the Costly Lever in Hierarchical Unification and Privileged Communities

把“费力杠杆—官民冲突—外部能量输入”的逻辑关系呈现出来：

Let us lay out the logical chain of “costly lever → official-people conflict → external energy input”:

黨国逻辑的阿基米德杠杆悖论
The Archimedean Lever Paradox of the Party-State

┌──────────────┐

│   官僚上层建筑     ←特权共同体：500家族+5000万人

└──────────────┘

▲

超负荷消耗

│

┌──────支点───────┐

│   “黨” (Gangs)   ← 本末倒置：支点不在“民”

└───────────────┘

动力臂        │     阻力臂

（人民创造力、民生经济）│ （特权消耗、官僚冗余）

太短         │        太长

▼

结构性失衡

┌──────────────┐

│ Bureaucratic Superstructure ← Privileged community: 500 clans + 50 million people

└──────────────┘

▲

Overburdened consumption

│

┌────── Fulcrum ────────┐

│   “Party” (Gangs)   ← Inverted: fulcrum not on the people

└──────────────────────┘

Effort arm         │     Resistance arm

(People’s creativity, livelihood economy) │ (Privileged consumption, bureaucratic redundancy)

Too short      │        Too long

▼

Structural imbalance

三个关键关系：

1、费力杠杆：支点设在“黨” → 动力臂短，阻力臂长。结果：人民再努力，也撬不动庞大的官僚机器。

2、官民冲突：当外部能量不足时，财政与资源分配失衡 → 官僚体系与民生必然矛盾。

3、外部能量输入：外贸顺差、全球资本、国际援助可暂时缓解矛盾；一旦减少，就会爆发周期性危机。

Three key relations:

1.Costly lever: Fulcrum set on the Party → short effort arm, long resistance arm. Result: no matter how hard the people work, they cannot move the massive bureaucratic machine.

2.Official-people conflict: When external energy is insufficient, fiscal and resource imbalances emerge, inevitably leading to conflict between bureaucracy and livelihood.

3.External energy input: Trade surpluses, global capital, and international aid may temporarily ease contradictions; once they diminish, cyclical crises erupt.

七、“官阶大一统”与“特权共同体”的费力杠杆（续）

The Paradox of the Costly Lever in Hierarchical Unification and Privileged Communities (continued)

20世纪最大的谎言，是一群地主、资本家的叛逆子弟，打坐江山却号称“无产阶级革命家”（颂歌和悼词如此）：

The greatest lie of the 20th century was that a group of rebellious offspring of landlords and capitalists seized political power, yet called themselves “proletarian revolutionaries” (so sung in odes and eulogies):

以革命的名义，夺取“人民民主专政”政权；以继续革命的名义，建立“全心全意为人民服务的社会主义共和国”体制；以改革开放的民族复兴的名义，维护“打从江山”的官本位举国货殖机制，简称“殖官主义”（Archer，2015）——即黨国政治的“官阶大一统”与“特权共同体”！

in the name of revolution, they took over the regime of the “people’s democratic dictatorship”; in the name of continuing the revolution, they established the system of a “socialist republic serving the people wholeheartedly”; and in the name of reform, opening-up, and national rejuvenation, they upheld a bureaucratic, state-centered mechanism of nationwide mercantile exploitation—shortened as “Officialism Colonialism” (殖官主义, Archer, 2015)—namely, the “unified official hierarchy” and “community of privilege” of Party-State politics!

不难发现，黨国政治+特权共同体的致命弱点，是如果没有“制度外部性”的能量输入，就必然陷入“费力杠杆”（动力臂小于阻力臂时）结构性失衡——庞大上层建筑与超负荷经济基础的矛盾冲突——中国历来不是阶级冲突，而是“官民冲突”！

It is clear that the fatal weakness of Party-State politics combined with privileged communities is that without “institutional external” energy inputs, it inevitably falls into the costly lever imbalance (effort arm shorter than resistance arm). This produces contradictions between an oversized bureaucratic superstructure and an overburdened economic base. In China, conflicts have historically never been about class struggle, but always about officials vs. the people!

八、前政要直言中国政体“失德、失能、失职”

Former Statesmen Bluntly Call the Chinese Regime “Immoral, Incompetent, Irresponsible”

当然，共产黨里少有的勇敢者如温家宝先生，2003年做总理不久取消农业税，取消劳动改造制度，也是基于同一理由。他2013下台前最后一次答记者问时说：中国不进行政治体制改革，经济改革的成果将会得而复失，文化大革命的悲剧还会重演！背后还是这个理儿——官多为患（张全景，1998）、官满为患（刘锡荣，2010）。

Of course, there were rare brave voices within the Communist Party, such as Wen Jiabao. Shortly after becoming Premier in 2003, he abolished the agricultural tax and the system of re-education through labor, based on the same reasoning. In his last press conference before stepping down in 2013, he warned: “If China does not carry out political reform, the achievements of economic reform will be lost, and the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution may happen again.” The underlying logic was the same—too many officials are harmful (Zhang Quanjing, 1998), a surplus of officials is disastrous (Liu Xirong, 2010).

随着WTO“15年缓冲期”结束，2016年以来“制度外部性”的逐渐丧失，常识告诉我们，用大白话说就是，没有谁养得起这个管天管地管思想的黨。

With the end of the WTO’s “15-year buffer period” and the gradual loss of institutional external inputs since 2016, common sense tells us plainly: no one can afford to sustain a Party that seeks to control heaven, earth, and even thought.

不只是中国人民养不起，全世界都养不起一个“官阶大一统”的黨。难怪新加坡前总理李显龙最近发出警告：“中国郑妇，十分危险”！

It is not only that the Chinese people cannot afford it; the entire world cannot afford a “hierarchical unification” Party. No wonder former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong recently warned: “China’s governance is extremely dangerous.”

李显龙对中国的批评，直言不讳。他甚至下意识地看不起“黨国郑妇”的几代领导人，认为这些家伙都是酒囊饭袋。

Lee Hsien Loong’s criticism of China was blunt and unreserved. He even subconsciously looked down upon successive leaders of the Party-State, calling them nothing but wine sacks and rice bags.

九、抽空“We the People”的荒谬逻辑——“主权高于人权”

李显龙说：中国自邓小平以来，没有真正取信于民，甚至一代不如一代。用邓小平理论来取代毛时代的政治、经济模式，有短板，不会长久，发展经济无疑是对的，但是，怎样发展，“黨国政府”一直稀里糊涂。今日这么说，明日那么说，这怎么行？

Lee Hsien Loong said: Since Deng Xiaoping, China has never truly gained the trust of its people, and each generation of leadership has been worse than the last. Replacing the Mao-era political and economic model with Deng Xiaoping’s theory had obvious shortcomings and could not last. Developing the economy was certainly correct, but the way it was pursued was muddled—one policy today, a completely different one tomorrow. How can this be sustainable?

中国自改革以来，毫无诚信可言。一直在骗民众，从给“四人帮”定罪开始，“四人帮”没啥错误，只是政治立场不同而已，给定了非常严重的罪名，这么做是不对的，政治立场不同，不用人家就是了，犯不上对簿公堂，这是中共开了不好的先河，最终在历史上交代不了，没法交代。

Since the reform era, China has had no credibility at all. It has consistently deceived its people. Starting with the conviction of the “Gang of Four”—who committed no real crimes beyond political differences—grave charges were fabricated against them. This was wrong. Different political positions should simply mean exclusion from power, not being dragged to trial. This set a terrible precedent, one that history will not be able to account for or justify.

一个执政者不单单要对现时代负责，要对历史负责。古代明君怕什么？怕历史评价不好。可是，今天的“黨国政府”领导人，管他什么历史评价，根本不考虑。

A ruler is not only responsible to the present but also to history. What did enlightened monarchs of old fear most? A poor evaluation by history. Yet today’s Party-State leaders do not care at all about how history will judge them.

今天的中国执政者，面对的是经济危机，也要面临政治危机。中国现在很危险，最大的问题就是政府失德，失能，失职，整个政府机能在空转。政府说话民众不听，也听不进去；民众想说话，政府不让说。政府与民众形成隔离带。这种官民冲突，对立，敌对趋势，政府对民众的硬伤害，是远久不能修复的。

Today’s Chinese rulers face not only an economic crisis but also a political crisis. China is now in grave danger. The biggest problem is that the government has lost virtue, lost competence, and lost responsibility; its entire machinery is idling. When the government speaks, the people do not listen—or cannot. When the people want to speak, the government silences them. A barrier has formed between the state and the people. This official–people antagonism, opposition, and hostility results in wounds inflicted by the government upon the people that cannot be healed for generations.

例如计划生育是基本国策，说停就停了，那就说明不是“基本国策”。竟然停了，给个解释嘛，这么说停就停呢？总得有个原因吧？事实上，计划生育违背人道、天道、神道，罪恶滔天，一开始，中国人民反对，被称为“天下第一难事”；全世界也反对，特别是世界人权组织，可是“黨国政府”硬怼回去，说什么这是“中国内政”，还有什么“主权高于人权”，荒谬至极。

Take family planning as an example. It was declared a “fundamental national policy,” yet it was suddenly halted. If it could be stopped so abruptly, then it was never truly “fundamental.” And if it was stopped, where was the explanation? Policies cannot simply be turned on and off like a switch; there must be a reason. In reality, family planning violated human morality, natural law, and divine law—it was a crime of staggering proportions. From the very beginning, the Chinese people opposed it, calling it “the world’s most difficult problem.” The entire world also opposed it, especially human rights organizations. Yet the Party-State brazenly retorted that it was “China’s internal affair” and even declared that “sovereignty is above human rights.” This is utterly absurd.

计划生育后遗症，可能延续300年不止。全国平均25%的家庭有子女不能结婚，中国忽然进入老龄化社会，“黨国政府”不知道该怎么应对。

The aftereffects of family planning may last for more than 300 years. On average, 25% of families in China now have children unable to marry. The country has suddenly entered an aging society, and the Party-State has no idea how to cope.

国家执政基础是民众，没有执政基础，政权就是空中楼阁，水中浮萍，没有根基，现在的领导人，在这方面似乎已经隐隐约约意识到了，但是，认识很不全面，采取的措施，很不得当。中国现在缺的是人心，简直是人心丧尽。40多年一个劲的折腾，把老百姓心伤苦了，伤透了，惨无人道呐。

The foundation of national governance is the people. Without this foundation, a regime is like a castle in the air, like duckweed floating in water—rootless and unstable. Today’s leaders seem vaguely aware of this, but their understanding is shallow, and their measures are woefully inadequate. What China lacks most now is the people’s trust; indeed, it has lost the people’s hearts altogether. Forty years of relentless upheaval have wounded the common people deeply, to the point of despair, in a manner inhumane and unconscionable.

十、WTO 15年缓冲期未完成的转型，以及“河蟹社会—黨进民退”的现实

The Failed Transformation after WTO’s 15-Year Buffer and the Reality of “River Crab Society—Party Advances, People Retreat”

李显龙不明白的是，当中国几乎答应一切条件承诺履行遵守一切规则而获准降低门槛（获“15年缓冲期”实现市场-规则经济）加入WTO后，结黨逻辑（黨国杠杆）受到民国逻辑（宪政杠杆）实实在在挑战，中国当局者，本该顺势而为应运完成这一历史转变（Transform）。

What Lee Hsien Loong failed to understand is this: when China agreed to virtually every condition and pledged to follow all rules in exchange for entry into the WTO—with a “15-year buffer” to transition into a market-ruled economy—the logic of Party-State (factional lever) faced a real challenge from republican logic (constitutional lever). At that historical juncture, China’s rulers should have seized the opportunity to complete the necessary transformation.

然而，当挑战来临之际，当局者一边精准提出“调整经济结构，转变政府职能”大政方针，一边却在意识形态上回到斗争思维——胡锦涛时期将老电影《星火》《红旗谱》等所谓红色经典重拍为电视剧配合针对“维权”的高压“维稳”，致使他自己提出的“科学发展观”与“和谐社会”迅速蜕变为“河蟹社会”与“黨进民退”。

Yet when the challenge came, the authorities, while precisely articulating major policies such as “adjusting the economic structure and transforming government functions,” ideologically reverted to the mentality of struggle. During Hu Jintao’s era, old revolutionary films such as Spark and Red Flag Spectrum were remade into TV dramas to accompany the heavy-handed “stability maintenance” campaign against rights defense movements. As a result, Hu’s own proposals of a “Scientific Outlook on Development” and a “Harmonious Society” quickly degenerated into a “River Crab Society” and a reality of “Party advances, people retreat.”

这一始于秦汉的“刑徒经济”“仇恨经济”“低端人口经济”，最终在“低人权优势”的条件下变成“争椅子”——黑格尔说的“流氓轮流坐庄”的现实版！

This perpetuated the old Qin–Han patterns of a “penal labor economy,” a “hatred economy,” and a “low-end population economy,” which under the condition of “low human rights advantage” devolved into a mere struggle over chairs—a real-life version of Hegel’s phrase “scoundrels taking turns in power.”

十一、所谓“亲中派”实为投机犬儒资本与权力沆瀣一气又勾心斗角

So-Called “Pro-China Factions” Are Cynical Opportunists Colluding with Power While Scheming Among Themselves

今天，从国际关系看，凡是声称“经济靠中国，安全靠美国”的所谓“亲中派”，都是瞄准了参与中国“半管制半市场经济”（全官寻租化、全民佃户化）收割和分赃的犬儒主义。

Today, in international relations, all those so-called “pro-China factions” who proclaim “economy depends on China, security depends on the U.S.” are essentially cynics seeking to exploit and share the spoils of China’s “semi-regulated, semi-market economy”—an economy characterized by total official rent-seeking and the transformation of the people into tenant serfs.

从“We the People”的角度看，都是加重社会成本的投机取巧、不靠谱的“脚踏两只船”的主儿！

From the perspective of We the People, they are nothing but opportunistic schemers who increase social costs—untrustworthy players trying to “stand with one foot in two boats.”

我不能不说，这其实包括新加坡，尽管李显龙对中国政体的本质洞悉得如此清楚，但新加坡资本（如淡马锡）并未羞于从与中国权力核心沆瀣一气中获利。

I must say this includes Singapore as well. Even though Lee Hsien Loong has such a clear understanding of the essence of China’s regime, Singaporean capital (such as Temasek) has not hesitated to profit from collusion with the very core of Chinese power.

和韩国、日本、美国、欧洲、澳洲资本相比，新加坡资本少了一些或避开了一些勾心斗角，但一直憋在心底而已。

Compared with capital from South Korea, Japan, the United States, Europe, and Australia, Singaporean capital may have engaged in fewer intrigues or avoided certain power struggles, but the reality remains that it has harbored the same motives all along.

结语 Conclusion

帝国政治的三重幻象——生命幻象、仪式幻象、政体幻象，本质上都是延续权力的面具。它们延长的是个人与派系的妄念，牺牲的却是人民的生命、社会的信任与文明的未来。

The triple illusions of imperial politics—illusions of life, ritual, and governance—are essentially masks for the perpetuation of power. What they prolong are the delusions of individuals and factions; what they sacrifice are the lives of the people, the trust of society, and the future of civilization.

唯有通过交互主体共生哲学（Intersubjective Symbiosism）——生命的自组织、社会的信任、文明的再平衡，人类才能摆脱这些幻象的循环，走向真正的和平与可持续共生。

Only through the philosophy of Intersubjective Symbiosism—life’s self-organization, social trust, and civilizational rebalancing—can humanity break free from these cycles of illusion and move toward genuine peace and sustainable coexistence.

Archer Hong Qian
2025年9月6日 · 波士顿 Citizen M Hotel 1212

9月10-11日修改于Halifax-Sydney途中

附件摘要：《敢问路在何方？内外合力，倒逼创新！——政治变革的最低成本（阻力）原则》

拣选与革命：Elitism与Peopulism

拣选（Election），是指被拣选者与造物主建立的特殊关系与约定，这种特殊关系与约定，是造物主赋予一部分人独特的身份、使命和责任，来传承造物主的旨意、律法、福音和价值（即中国语境中的“天命”）。但需要说明两点，第一，拣选并不意味着优越或排斥其他人，而是强调被拣选者的存在和行为应该成为其他人的榜样；所以第二，如果被拣选者不能在自己的思想行为中“传承造物主的旨意、律法、福音和价值”，那么，即使你是被造物主拣选的人，仍然可以被取而代之——就是被“革除天命”。

 在中国语境中，古代以王者受命于天，称王者易姓、改朝换代为“革命”。《周易·革卦·彖传》：“天地革而四时成，汤武革命，顺乎天而应乎人。”古代中国人相信上天授权统治者管理天下，当统治者失德，不敬天，不尽己，不勤政，不爱民，弄得天怒人怨，天命就要更改，这就叫“革命”，即“革除天命”。革，变革；命，天命。在现代政治学中，革命（Revolution）指当民众反抗政府时，现行政治权力、政治组织和经济结构发生根本性改进、改良和改变。

 然而，汤武革命后，秦制汉儒以降，几乎凡遇历史选择和改变，为什么我们中国，几乎总是选择最差的，至多是次好的？以至于黑格尔在《法哲学原理》一书中，不无偏蔽，却又特别现象级地写道：“中国从本质上看是没有真正的历史的，它只是君王覆灭更迭的不断重复罢了，任何进步都未能从中诞生。几千年的中国，其实是一个大赌场，恶棍们轮流坐庄，混蛋们换班执政，炮灰们总是做祭品，这才是中国历史的本来面目。事实上，中国任何一次革命都没能使这个历史改变。”

在黑格尔看来，只有在“精神”领域的变化中，才有新的东西发生。在人类使命中，达到“尽善尽美性”的冲动，是真正的达到精神解放、获得自由的变化能力。而这样的历史从未在当时的中国发生过。秦制汉儒以降，中原政权皆行“权力操纵、资源垄断”——成王败寇、赢者通吃，皇帝一人享有人身自由，但却没有精神自由，其他所有人更是缺乏任何自由，只要这种制度不发生实质性改变，个体就不会产生理性与自由的觉醒，中国就不曾开启过精神自我否定、超越并逐步实现自由的历史，只是一次次诱发“彼可取而代之”的冲动，以至于“循环取代”式内斗。所谓“分久必合，合久必分”，2700年间这片与世隔离的土地上，发生大大小小战争6000千余次（中国战史专家王小平）。

近代以来，从乾隆禁海令，到“鸦片战争”“洋务运动”“戊戌变法”，从“二次革命”“五四新文化运动”，到“一边倒”“继续革命”（反右、文革），在中国融入世界现代文明的历史进程中，并没有精神的自由意识的觉醒，虽然也似乎有精英主义（Elitism）与民粹主义（Peopulism）的交替登场，却都不过是为了“选择复制”的“道不同，不相为谋”，所以只是在世界历史分岔的两条路径上，陷入悲剧性的二元对立选择。两种路径是指：

第一条路径是，1215大宪章-1688光荣革命-1769工业革命-1786美国独立-1948世界人权宣言，民权宪政；

第二条路径是，1789法国大革命-1871巴黎公社（共产）-1917十月革命-国共三次内战后的一边倒和继续革命，官权专政……

问题在于，无论是前一路径，还是后一路径，在其原发地都葆有纠错机制和纠偏能力（如法国五次共和），而中华每一次从精英和草莽中拣选出来窃取“国家”权力的特权者，都是抱持“打江山坐江山”一姓独大作死到底的物欲不悔改不思改变，陷入不断推倒重来原地打转的“魔咒”！

且说1949年后的74年，先往回追溯……

1949年后的中国，显然选择的是“第二条路径”。1958年5月8日在中共8大二中全会上，毛泽东谈到“秦始皇是厚今薄古的专家”，林彪插话说，秦始皇焚书坑儒，毛说，“秦始皇算什么？他只坑了四百六十个儒，我们坑了四万六个儒。我们镇反。还没有杀掉反革命的知识分子吗？我与民主人士辩论过，你骂我们是秦始皇，不对，我们超过了秦始皇一百倍（大笑）”。同年8月19日毛泽东在北戴河会议上发表讲话，针对当时所谓“专讲民主”、不讲集中的无政府状况（“几十万个政府”），提出“马克思要与秦始皇结合起来”。其实，毛说的马克思，并非讲自由和发现“全部历史的第一个前提无疑是有生命的个人的存在”的马克思（1845），而是在《国家与革命》中实施“无产阶级专政”的列宁、斯大林。

所以，1949年后选择的是“中国特色第二条路径”，即：毛主义=秦制汉儒+列斯（秦制：用官驭民两全体制；汉儒：假公济私货殖机制；列斯：党国资本特权优先）。

这条路径，走到1970代后反复出现“庞大上层建筑与超负荷经济基础矛盾冲突”，再也走不下去了，于是逐渐有了1980年代后，加上“邓陈：官阶商贾自己人上”，亦即“中国特色半统制半市场”混合制（吴敬琏）路径。

Elitism：商鞅驭民六术与苏绰驭官三术

然而，1949-1978年后，虽然中国（大陆）选择世界历史的“第二条路径”，实行“毛主义=秦制汉儒+列斯+邓陈”混合制，但始终坚持“不断重复”的本土“用官驭民”的中国特色。

商鞅驭民六术

弱民：通过让民众弱化，达到国家强大的目的；

贫民：剥夺人民的余银余财，使人民家无积粟，眼里只有穷富一边，争当富者；

疲民：为民寻事，让他们疲于奔命，使民无暇顾及他事；

辱民：剥夺人民的尊严和自信，使人民更加尊重官员；

愚民：通过控制人民的知识和信息，使百姓不会独立思考；

虐民：选拔重用奸恶之人，让他们实行恶政，以达到治国强盛的目的。

苏绰驭官三术

概括越来，就是用贪官，确保他们忠诚；杀贪官，排除异己；杀大贪；以平民愤、没收财产为我所用。

宇文泰是北周的开国皇帝，请教谋士苏绰，如何治国才能永保江山不倒，不被刨祖坟？

苏绰回答，用官。又问，如何用官。答，用贪官，反贪官。那怎么用贪官呢？你要叫别人为你卖命，就必须给他好处。而你又没有那么多钱给他们，那就只能给他权，让他们自己想办法用权生钱，叫他们用手中的权去搜刮民脂民膏不就可以搞到钱了吗？

又问，贪官是得到好处了，对我有什么好处呢？苏绰回，他们能得到好处，是因为你给的权利，所以他为了保住自己的好处，就必须维护你的权利。那么你的统治不就稳固了吗？

宇文泰又问，既然用贪官，为什么还要反贪官呢？苏绰回答，这就是治述的精髓所在。宇文泰就挪到苏绰身旁，谦虚的说，请先生教我。苏绰答到，这里面有两个好处：

一是天下无官不贪，不怕官贪，就怕官员不听话。所以可以用反贪的名义踢除不听话的贪官，保留听话的贪官，这样既可以消除异己，巩固自己的权利，又可以受到民众的爱戴。

二是官员只要贪，你就有把柄在手。他们诚惶诚恐，担心你治他的罪，他越担心就越忠诚。他敢不听话就是自找死路。所以他一定会跟你同心同德，这就是御官之术。

而如果都是清官，那么人民是喜欢的。但是你的位置就危险了，为什么呢？那是因为清官仗着自己清廉，说话直，态度强硬，一定会冒犯你。这种看上去是忠诚的行为，其实就是犯上。你如果忍不了要罢免他，那么民众就会抱怨，有怨气，你的位置就保不住了。

宇文泰大喜！苏绰随即黑着脸就反问道，陛下再没有什么想问的吗？宇文泰大吃一惊，还有什么需要问的吗？好像没了。苏绰反问，如果任用贪官，而使民怨沸腾怎么办呢？宇文泰听了汗如雨下，再次靠前匍匐的问，那该怎么办呢？

苏绰说，你就祭起反贪大旗，广作宣誓，使天下人都知道你是心系天下，最恨贪官。宇文泰问，那如果贪官惹得民怨太大，该怎么收拾残局呢？苏绰说，杀之即可，抄家，没收财产，这样做既能平息民怨，称赞你的英明，又能没收财产，何乐而不为呢？

反观当代，展望未来??

秦制汉儒以降，行商鞅驭民、苏绰用官之术以来，在成王败寇赢者通吃、天下为公假公济私（利出一孔利入一孔）的宗法（帮派）政治架构中，所谓的士大夫精英们，死谏死战的文武百官，不过是待烹的“牧羊犬”（干部）；所谓的升斗小民草根们，韭菜炮灰的人民群众，不过是待宰的“君之羊”（群众）。

所以，中国从来没有世界历史中（第一条路径与第二条路径）呈现的所谓“阶级斗争”，只有“官官相护的官民斗争”、“驭民相残的官官斗争”、“挑拨离间的民民斗争”，没有精英主义，更没有民粹主义，有，也只是犬儒式Elitism，有也只是牛羊式Peopulism。

因而，无论为官为民，总体上都难逃悲催的宿命。从商鞅的“驭民”，到汉儒官阶官职“大一统”，从苏绰的“驭官”，再到苏俄党国资本特权主义，形成了一种奇特的非宪政的“科举取仕与党管干部迭代混合制”，也是中华精英与草根的双向选择，结果总是一次次轰然倒塌于：民怨沸腾与官腐遍地的结构性失衡！

所以，在中华“大赌场”上，帝王统治术倒也并不复杂，就是玩“平衡”——平衡“官官斗争、民民斗争、官民斗争”三种斗争关系，玩溜了，继续坐庄，玩砸了，顷刻完蛋！

时至今日，社会原子化的举国体制“梦魇”，形成“全官寻租化-全民佃户化”，让“共和国公民”在所谓特色社会主义（半统制半市场）导致权力与资本沆瀣一气又勾心斗角闹剧中，沦为宗法帮派专制政治经济文化的“韭菜”或“炮灰”命运——精英主义的惰性与民粹主义的惯性！

 总之，秦制汉儒毛文革后遗症+陈云自己人祖坟忧虑+小平一部分人富裕设置，结果就是，再次走到官腐民怨临界状態。

孞烎2023年12月11-13日草于温哥华

——摘自《敢问路在何方？——政治变革的最低成本（阻力）原则》http://symbiosism.com.cn/7974.html