Charles Schwab/嘉信公司2024年股东会议改进高层报酬提案
很多年来,我用于股东提案的个人退休基金都放在证券公司TD Ameritrade的账户上。今年,TD Ameritrade被更大的证券公司Charles Schwab/嘉信[1]收购,我预感在获取股份证明时会遇到麻烦,从9月开始要求Charles Schwab提供股份材料,陆续收到了我持有的Applied Materials/应用材料公司、The Travelers Companies、Bank of America Corporation等公司的股份证明信。
9月25日,我要求Charles Schwab提供我持有的Charles Schwab公司本身的股份证明信。9月26日,Charles Schwab回复说“Your monthly accounts statements will be able to show ownerships of the Charles Schwab Corp ( SCHW). If this is not sufficient, we will need additional context as to why the letter is needed before we can generate this for you./你的每月账目报表将能够显示嘉信理财公司 (SCHW) 的所有权。如果这还不够,我们将需要更多背景信息知道为什么你需要这封信才能为你写出这封信。”我随即附上Charles Schwab9月22日发出的Applied Materials的股份证明,再次说明是为了提交股东提案需要类似的股份证明信。
如我所预料,Charles Schwab一直没有回复。10月2日,我再次询问Charles Schwab何时可以收到股份证明,并第三次说明是为了提交股东提案需要股份证明信。Charles Schwab当日回复到:“It appears that our team will need some additional details. Please call our team at 800-435-**** so we can directly reach out to our Operations team with you on the line to discuss such a custom letter. At this time, our team is stating that you would need to use your statements unless further details can be provided./看来我们的团队需要一些额外的细节。请致电800-435-**** 联系我们的团队,以便我们可以直接联系我们的运营团队与你在线讨论此类顾客信件。目前,我们的团队声明:除非可以提供进一步的详细信息,否则你将需要使用你的账号报表。”
我这段期间与老朋友John Chevedden联系,他也有在TD Ameritrade的账号被转到Charles Schwab。我最大的担忧是Charles Schwab从此拒绝提供股份证明、我不得不把基金转移到另外一个证券公司的话,按照美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的“长期持有”规定,我这样的小股东必须再等三年以上才能得到可以提案的股份证明信。他也向Charles Schwab要求股份证明,10月3日得到“三个商务日之内可以发出”的正常回复,答应要帮助我一同向Charles Schwab或SEC交涉、反映。
10月4日上午,我打通了Charles Schwab的电话,向接电话的女士讲明事项,提出几个问题:20年来TD Ameritrade一直提供股份证明,为什么Charles Schwab不提供?SEC会容许Charles Schwab这样做吗?为什么Charles Schwab对有些公司的股份证明不要求额外信息,而对有些公司(Charles Schwab)的股东证明要求额外信息?Charles Schwab需要什么样的额外信息?要求这些额外信息的依据是什么?
预感到事态的严重性,我特意回避Charles Schwab9月26日给我的电邮:“I wanted to let you know that we would not be able to fulfill such a letter request going forward as it is outside of the usual parameters that we are able to fulfill./我想让你知道,我们今后将无法满足提供此类信件的请求,因为它超出了我们能够履行的通常业务。”因为要推翻这样的拒绝服务声明,需要长期的努力,甚至法庭的斗争,这超出了我的资源。
这位诚实的女士明白她无法解决我的问题,就告诉一个特殊电邮,让我把问题提升到上一级去。我写了两页纸的申诉,详细提供9月25日以来的通讯,最后附加SEC关于股东提案的规定Rule 14a-8,发给这个电邮,同时也发给Charles Schwab的公司Secretary/秘书长。为了显示善意,我表示愿意为股东证明信付费。
10月6日,Charles Schwab终于发出我持有3年以上Charles Schwab股份的证明,我立即发出付诸2024年股东大会的提案:
Shareholder Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation Program
改进高管薪酬规划的股东提案
Resolved: shareholders recommend that the Charles Schwab Corporation (the Company) improve the executive compensation program to include the CEO pay ratio factor./决议:股东们提议Charles Schwab(以下简称“本公司”)改进高管薪酬规划,将首席执行官薪酬比率因素纳入其中。
Supporting Statement/支持提案的声明
The Company’s CEO compensation jumped irregularly, irrationally, and unreasonably from $15,959,193 in 2020 to $21,938,404 in 2021 (+37.5%), to $24,386,329 in 2022 (+11.2%) (2023 Proxy Statement p.54). The CEO pay ratio was 210:1 in 2022 (2023 Proxy Statement p.67). As I am writing the proposal today, the stock price dropped from $80.90 on October 11, 2021 to $74.31 on October 7, 2022 (-8.1%), to $51.52 on October 6, 2023 (-30.7%). /本公司的首席执行官的薪酬不合规则地、不合理性地、没有原因地从2020年的15,959,193美元跃升至2021年的21,938,404 美元(+37.5%),再到2022年的24,386,329美元(+11.2%)(2023年股东会议声明第54页)。2022年CEO薪酬比例为210:1(第67页)。当我今天撰写提案时,本公司股价从2021年10月11日的80.90美元跌至2022年10月7日的74.31美元(-8.1%),再跌至2023年10月6日的51.52美元(-30.7%)。
America’s ballooning executive compensation is not sustainable for the economy, and there is no rational methodology or program to decide the executive compensation, particularly because there is no consideration of the CEO pay ratio factor (2023 Proxy Statement pp.36-71). The increase of disparity of income has a direct negative impact on American social instability. For example, one article from Politico.com 09/16/2023 "‘No defensible argument’: Anger boils over at CEO pay" stated: “The historic UAW strike puts an exclamation point on more than a decade of efforts ... to narrow the pay gap between top executives and workers. ... And between 1978 and 2021, executive compensation at large American companies increased by more than 1,400 percent.”/美国不断膨胀的高管薪酬对于经济来说是不可持续的,并且没有合理的方法论或规划来决定高管薪酬,特别是因为没有考虑CEO薪酬比率因素(2023年股东会议声明第36-71页)。收入差距的扩大对美国社会不稳定产生直接负面影响。例如,Politico.com 2023年9月16 日发布的一篇文章“‘没有任何可辩护的余地’:对CEO 薪酬的愤怒沸腾”指出:“历史性的UAW罢工给十多年来…… 缩小高管与员工之间的薪酬差距的努力打上了感叹号。 ……从1978年到2021年,美国大型公司的高管薪酬增长了1,400%以上。”
The public gives the board a free hand to run the corporate business so there is no organized union in big financial companies, there is no employee representation on board, and the board is nominated without any competition (the number of candidates is the same number of board seats). Adam Smith said: “Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power.” America has a long history to check and balance power. Shareholders in JPMorgan Chase & Co., Intel, Netflix and other big companies rejected sky-high executive pay packages in 2022 and 2023./公众让董事会可以自由地经营公司业务,因而大型金融公司中不存在有组织的工会、董事会中没有员工代表、董事会的提名没有经过任何竞争(候选人数量与董事会席位数量相同)。 亚当·斯密说:“正如霍布斯先生所说,财富就是权力。”美国有着制衡权力的悠久历史。摩根大通、英特尔、Netflix等大公司的股东拒绝了2022年和2023年的天价高管薪酬方案。
The CEO pay ratios of big Japanese and European companies are much less than of big American companies. As a policy recommendation, the Company may refer to Aristotle’s Politiká/Politics, in which he concluded that in a stable polis community, the disparity of land ownership should not be more than 5 times. The Company has the flexibility to reform the Compensation Committee to improve the executive compensation program, such as to include the CEO pay ratio factor./日本和欧洲大公司的首席执行官薪酬比率远低于美国大公司。作为政策建议,本公司可参考亚里士多德的《政治学》,其中他的结论是,在一个稳定的城邦社区中,土地所有权的差距不应超过5倍。本公司可以灵活地改革薪酬委员会以改善高管薪酬规划,例如纳入首席执行官薪酬比率因素。
10月10日,Charles Schwab通知我收到了我的提案。10月17日,Charles Schwab询问我举行电话或视频会议的时间。10月25日,我与Charles Schwab的法务、投资等部门的7个人进行电话会议,他们显然事前认真研读了我的提案。我介绍自己20年来向众多科技、金融、制药等行业的大公司提交提案的经验和教训,详细解释对Charles Schwab提案的意义。最后,主持人律师问我为什么在提案里引用亚里士多德、斯密等经典。我指出:在今天的动荡时代,更需要回到希腊思想家们和《圣经》的教诲。没想到他表示同意,说可以教育他的孩子学习经典的意义!
考虑到今后还必须不断从Charles Schwab得到各公司的股份证明,我指出:“付诸表决不是提案的目的,目的是改进高管薪酬规划,如果Charles Schwab愿意学习Intel、Microsoft公司那样听取外部专家意见并部分接受我的提案,我可以主动撤回提案;如果因为Charles Schwab与我的提案差距太大而无法采取行动改进,可以只付诸一次表决听取广大股东的意见,我今后不再提交提案。”我期待Charles Schwab能够理性地对待我的提案,但也做好持久战的准备。
改进美国公司的企业治理任重道远。欣慰的是:我20年来的努力已经迈出了一小步,缓慢地得到相关各界特别是越来越多的股东们的理解和响应[2]。希望能够借助公众的压力,进一步推动企业界特别是金融行业的几家“领头羊”公司召开圆桌会议,专门讨议高层报酬问题、达成基本的原则共识,并采纳相应政策和方法论,改善这个企业治理的癌症难题。
[赵京,中日美比较政策研究所,2023年10月30日]
【补充】
2024年3月13日,我收到Charles Schwab把我的提案付诸表决的通知和董事会的反对声明,值得翻译,以便将来引用。
Board of Directors’ Recommendation Against and Statement of Opposition to the Stockholder Proposal/董事会对这个股东议案的反对建议和反对声明
Our executive compensation program is designed through thoughtful application of a combination of pay elements to ensure an adept, driven executive team whose incentives square with company and stockholder interests. Our board believes that given the company’s strong existing practices, which have historically received broad stockholder support, the adoption of this proposal is unnecessary, as its implementation would not meaningfully enhance the company’s executive compensation program. For these reasons and the reasons set forth below, after careful consideration, our board unanimously recommends a vote AGAINST this proposal./我们的高管薪酬计划是通过深思熟虑地应用薪酬要素的组合来设计的,以确保一支熟练、有动力的高管团队,其激励措施与公司和股东的利益相一致。我们的董事会认为,鉴于公司现有的强有力的做法历来得到了广泛的股东支持,因此没有必要采用该提案,因为其实施不会有意义地提高公司的高管薪酬计划。由于这些原因以及下文所述的原因,经过仔细考虑,我们的董事会一致建议对该提案投反对票。
Our Executive Compensation Program Has Been Carefully Tailored to Help Our Company Achieve Its Strategic Goals and Align With the Long-Term Interests of Our Stockholders./我们的高管薪酬计划经过精心定制,以帮助我们公司实现其战略目标并符合股东们的长期利益。
As extensively detailed in the section entitled “Compensation Discussion and Analysis” above, our executive compensation program and philosophy are thoughtfully designed and applied, contrary to the erroneous assertion in the proposal that “there is no rational methodology or program to determine the executive compensation.” Our program supports the company’s strategic objectives through a design intended to attract, motivate, and retain talented, highly capable executive officers, reward executive officers for their performance, link pay with company performance, and align executive officers’ incentives with the long-term interests of the company and its stockholders. Our Compensation Committee evaluates our executive compensation practices on an ongoing basis to determine whether they support the company’s strategic objectives and serve these design principles. Our pay decisions take into consideration a wide range of factors, including competitive pay analysis of peer companies, the company’s performance, the economic environment, and market trends. As described in more detail under “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” a significant portion of our executive compensation is performance-based and dependent upon the success of the company in creating long-term value for its shareholders. In addition, our executive compensation practices are tailored to account for each executive’s experience, responsibilities, changes in job scope, individual performance, and pay relative to internal peers. We believe this approach helps us attract and retain the most talented employees to drive innovation, creativity, growth, and long-term value for our stockholders. The proposal would interfere with this carefully designed executive compensation program, which we believe is not only effective but integral to our success./正如上文“薪酬讨论与分析”一节所详细阐述的那样,我们的高管薪酬方案和理念是经过深思熟虑设计和应用的,与提案中“没有合理的方法论或方案来确定高管薪酬”的错误说法相反。我们的计划通过旨在吸引、激励和留住有才华、高能力的执行官的设计来支持公司的战略目标,奖励执行官的绩效,将薪酬与公司绩效挂钩,并使执行官的激励与公司及其股东们的长期利益保持一致。 我们的薪酬委员会持续评估我们的高管薪酬实践,以确定它们是否支持公司的战略目标并服务于这些设计原则。我们的薪酬决策考虑了多种因素,包括同行公司的竞争性薪酬分析、公司业绩、经济环境和市场趋势。正如“薪酬讨论与分析”中更详细地描述的,我们的高管薪酬的很大一部分是基于绩效的,并且取决于公司在为股东创造长期价值方面的成功。此外,我们的高管薪酬实践是根据每位高管的经验、职责、工作范围的变化、个人绩效以及相对于内部同行的薪酬而量身定制的。我们相信,这种方法有助于我们吸引和留住最有才华的员工,从而推动创新、创造力、增长和股东们的长期价值。该提案将干扰精心设计的高管薪酬计划,我们认为该计划不仅有效,而且对我们的成功不可或缺。
CEO Pay Ratios Provide Little Comparative Value for Our Executive Compensation Program./首席执行官薪酬比率对我们的高管薪酬计划几乎没有提供比较价值。
Although SEC rules require annual disclosure of the CEO pay ratio, our Compensation Committee does not believe that the ratio should define or drive our compensation principles or practices. CEO pay ratios vary widely across companies, as different companies have different employment and compensation practices, depending on the nature of their workforce, their business, and various other factors. According to the SEC, the purpose of CEO pay ratio disclosures is not to facilitate comparisons among companies, and conformity or comparability of pay ratios across companies is not necessarily achievable given the variety of factors that could cause ratios to differ, as companies may utilize different methodologies, exclusions, estimates and assumptions in calculating their pay ratios. As a result, the utility of CEO pay ratio as a comparative metric at the company, industry-wide, and across industries is limited./尽管SEC规则要求每年披露CEO/首席执行官薪酬比率,但我们的薪酬委员会认为该比率不应定义或驱动我们的薪酬原则或实践。不同公司的首席执行官薪酬比率差异很大,因为不同的公司根据员工的性质、业务和各种其他因素有不同的雇佣和薪酬做法。根据SEC的说法,披露CEO薪酬比率的目的不是为了促进公司之间的比较,而且鉴于可能导致比率不同的因素多种多样,公司之间的薪酬比率不一定能够实现一致性或可比性,因为公司可能会利用不同的薪酬比率。计算其薪资比率的方法、排除情况、估计和假设。因此,CEO薪酬比率作为公司、全行业和跨行业的比较指标的效用是有限的。
Stockholders Have Overwhelmingly Supported Our Executive Compensation Practices./股东绝大多数支持我们的高管薪酬实践。
Our board and management team value the opinions and feedback of our stockholders, which is why we have regular, ongoing engagement with our stockholders throughout the year regarding a variety of topics, including our executive compensation program and philosophy. Our board and management team regularly discuss our stockholders’ feedback. In addition, our stockholders have consistently and overwhelmingly endorsed the company’s pay practices—since 2010, each year our advisory proposal to approve the company’s executive compensation has THE CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION 2024 PROXY STATEMENT 77 PROPOSALS FOUR, FIVE, AND SIX: STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS received support from at least 91% of the votes cast. Most recently, at the 2023 annual meeting of stockholders, stockholders approved our advisory proposal to approve the company’s executive compensation by approximately 92% of the votes cast, similar to the levels of support expressed at our 2022 (93%) and 2021 (94%) annual meetings of stockholders./我们的董事会和管理团队重视股东们的意见和反馈,这就是为什么我们全年定期、持续地与股东们就各种主题(包括我们的高管薪酬计划和理念)进行接触。我们的董事会和管理团队定期讨论股东的反馈。此外,我们的股东们始终以压倒性多数支持公司的薪酬实践——自 2010 年以来,每年我们批准公司高管薪酬的咨询提案都得到支持91%股份的选票赞同。最近,在2023年股东年会上,股东以约92%股份的投票数赞同了我们关于公司高管薪酬的咨询提案,与我们2022年(93%股份)和2021年(94%股份)得到的赞同水平相似。
Summary/总结
For these reasons, the Board has determined that support for this stockholder proposal is unwarranted and believes that our current compensation program is appropriate and designed in a manner that our Compensation Committee – which is best positioned to evaluate and determine the design of our executive compensation program – believes is in the best interest of the company and our stockholders. For these reasons, we recommend a vote against the stockholder proposal./由于这些原因,董事会认为对这一股东提案的支持是没有根据的,并认为我们当前的薪酬计划是适当的,并且是按照我们的薪酬委员会的方式设计的--该委员会最适合评估和确定我们的高管薪酬的设计—,相信符合公司和股东们的最佳利益。出于这些原因,我们建议对此股东提案投反对票。
5月7日,我收到一位股东的热情洋溢的电邮,说他非常赞同我的提案的要点。
5月23日,我通过电话参加股东年会,宣读了我的第4号会议(第1号股东)提案。当场宣布的初步结果是3个股东提案都没有通过。今天,我才从公司网址读到股东提案的正式结果:公司关于高层报酬的第3号提案得到1,352,679,636股赞同(90.8%),136,965,265股反对(9.2%),2,067,030股弃权,61,320,014股未投票。我的第4号提案得到63,702,064股赞同(4.5%),1,414,674,878股反对(95.5%),13,334,990股弃权,61,320,014股未投票。这个结果比较偏向公司,但不意外,因为我2023年10月6日提交提案之后,公司通过与我的交流,相应地作出改善,CEO的总收入从2022年24,386,329美元降为2023年23,871,744美元;另外4个高管中,3人的总收入略微下降、1人略微上升,实际上部分响应了我的提案,得到了多数股东的赞同。
我的提案赞同股低于5%,明年不能继续提案同样的内容。虽然还可以就董事会结构改革(介入员工代表)、董事会独立(主席与CEO分离)、民主差额选举等重要的企业治理提案,但考虑到我的所有用于投资的退休基金账号都存在Charles Schwab,我需要它为我开具股份证明才能向(别的)公司提交提案,暂时不考虑再向Charles Schwab提案了。
[赵京,中日美比较政策研究所,2024年5月29日]
[1] 2023年10月30日,Market Cap/市场资产924亿美元,雇员35,300人,汉语网址https://www.schwab.com/chinese-language-services-zh:“嘉信協助在美國的華人進行投資已有超過 20年的經驗,我們用您所熟悉的語言助您對您的財務需求進行規劃。您將取得以事實為基礎、專業的指引,以及滿足您的需求的多種投資帳戶,更有以絕佳的價格提供給您的廣泛投資選擇。”
[2] Jing Zhao, Shareholder Proposals:The Archimedes Lever of a Social Gadfly, Fifth Edition, 2023. https://cpri.tripod.com/2023/gadfly5.pdf. 书中收入我向JPMorgan, Apple, Wells Fargo, PG&E, AT&T, Visa, Applied Materials, eBay, Netflix等公司提交的付诸表决的改善高层报酬政策的提案。